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Abstract: Most critics of contemporary literature have reached a consensus that what was once 
called “postmodernism” is over and that its signature modes—metafiction and irony—are on the 
wane. This is not the case, however, with videogames. In recent years, a number of self-reflexive 
games have appeared, exemplified by Davey Wreden’s The Stanley Parable (2013), an ironic 
game about games. When self-awareness migrates form print to screen, however, something 
happens. If metafiction can be characterized by how it draws attention to its materiality—the 
artificiality of language and the construction involved in acts of representation—The Stanley 
Parable draws attention to the digital, procedural materiality of videogames. Following the work 
of Alexander R. Galloway and Ian Bogost, I argue that the self-reflexivity of The Stanley Parable 
is best understood in terms of action and procedure, as metaproceduralism. This essay explores 
the legacies of United States metafiction in videogames, suggesting that though postmodernism 
might be over, its lessons are important to remember for confronting the complex digital realities 
of the twenty-first century. If irony may be ebbing in fiction, it has found a vital and necessary 
home in videogames and we underestimate its power to challenge the informatic, algorithmic logic 
of cultural production in the digital age to our detriment. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Stanley Parable (2013) is a videogame about videogames. Originally released by 
Davey Wreden in 2011 as a Half-Life 2 modification, the game was developed into a standalone 
commercial release with modeler William Pugh using Valve’s Source game engine. Since its 
successful debut on Steam in 2013, The Stanley Parable has received significant popular and 
critical attention. It has been discussed at length by the considerable media apparatus that covers 
the videogame industry; it has sparked ongoing online debates about whether or not it is really a 
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game; and, with the appearance of videogames such as Dear Esther (2012) and Gone Home (2013), 
it has perhaps once and for all put to rest the debate about whether or not videogames are art.1 
Pugh and Wreden’s self-referential metagame has also quickly attracted attention from a variety 
of academic fields and from a large number of bloggers.2 Taking its cue from self-referential 
postmodern forms, The Stanley Parable is a complex, historically self-aware metafiction that 
dwells critically on the generic, formal, and cultural conventions of videogames. Through 
mechanics that adapt and repurpose the material self-reflexivity of twentieth-century metafiction, 
Pugh and Wreden’s experimental game raises important questions about the end of 
postmodernism, its legacies, and the digital realities of the twenty-first century. 
Crucially, The Stanley Parable has appeared at a historical moment when it seems apparent 
that, after twenty years of critics declaring its end, a rough consensus has emerged that considers 
United States cultural production to have finally moved beyond postmodernism. Though there 
have been a variety of reasons for the proclamations and general agreement about the waning of 
postmodernity, the shifting landscape of US fiction has been, for many, evidence of a 
transformation in the aesthetic regime of the present. The contemporary novel, we are told, has 
                                               
1 Rather than “video game,” following the usage by scholars such as Ian Bogost, Patrick Jagoda, and others, I 
purposely use the term videogame throughout this essay because I think that we need a distinct term for the procedural, 
actionable, aesthetic artifacts native to digital environments. As one word, videogame stresses neither the 
computational, narratological, nor ludic aspects of such objects, but conceptually and elegantly unites the many 
possible qualities digital games might have, allowing that even games without play and games without narrative can 
still be understood as part of a single, coherent medium defined by the relationship between user action and digital 
processes. I would like to think that the term videogame can cover texts such as Dear Esther and Gone Home as much 
as Braid (2008), Call of Duty (2003–15), Mass Effect (2007–12), Microsoft Solitaire (1990), or Tetris (1984), even if 
the former lack the ludic elements of the latter. Just as we do not sit around complaining that a lyric poem lacks a 
story, and thus argue about why poetry should be excluded from the category of literature, I am doubtful how 
productive or even necessary it is to ask whether or not The Stanley Parable is a game. But I do hope it will be 
productive to think about how it is a videogame, that is, as an example of a now fully emerged, culturally dominant 
art form. 
2 For a discussion of The Stanley Parable by communications scholars, see Malte Elson, Johannes Breuer, James D. 
Ivory, and Thorsten Quandt, “More Than Stories with Buttons: Narrative, Mechanics, and Context as Determinants 
of Player Experience in Digital Games,” Journal of Communication 64 (2014): 521–42; by computational scholars, 
see Michael James Heron and Pauline Belford, “All of Your Co-Workers Are Gone: Story, Substance, and the 
Empathic Puzzler,” Journal of Games Criticism 2, no. 1 (2015): 1–29; by education scholars, see Ioanna Iacovides, 
Anna L. Cox, and Thomas Knoll, “Learning the Game: Breakdowns, Breakthroughs and Player Strategies,” CHI 2014 
(April 26–May 1, 2014): 2215–20; for a Foucauldian reading of the game, see Lars de Wildt, “Precarious Play: To Be 
or Not to Be Stanley,” Press Start 1, no. 1 (2014): 1–20; and for some of the better popular reactions, see Alex Cowan, 
“The Stanley Paradox: A Postmodern Parable,” Medium, December 19, 2014, https://medium.com/@alexcowan2/the-
stanley-paradox-a-postmodern-parable-36a4fb8cdad7; linehollis, “Esther and Stanley and Fate,” Nightmare Mode, 
March 17, 2013, http://nightmaremode.thegamerstrust.com/2013/03/17/esther-and-stanley-and-fate/; and Miguel 
Penabella, “An Ode to Stanley and Esther,” Medium Difficulty, November 20, 2012, http://www.mediumdifficulty. 
com/2012/11/20/an-ode-to-stanley-esther/.  
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moved away from the metafictional, ironic experimentation of surfiction and the Black 
Humorists.3 Realism and sincerity, affect and direct communication—these are the dominant 
modes of contemporary fiction. Such an account owes much to David Foster Wallace’s influential 
essay, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” (1993). Diagnosing a 1990s culture 
industry that had absorbed the lessons of postmodern metafiction—“TV’s institutionalization of 
hip irony”4—Wallace concludes his essay with a prescient prediction about the emergence of a 
sincere, earnest generation of fiction writers who may “have the childish gall actually to endorse 
and instantiate single-entendre principles.”5 A glance at some of the most visible contemporary 
US novelists—Jennifer Egan, Jeffrey Eugenides Jonathan Safran Foer, Jonathan Franzen, Donna 
Tartt, and many others—seems good evidence of what Adam Kelly has importantly called a “new 
sincerity” in contemporary fiction.6  
But I would like to suggest in this essay that the emergence and adaptation of what Wallace 
would call “postmodern irony” in contemporary videogames is evidence not of a regression to a 
cold war poetics, nor just more of the same old postmodernism—the exhaustion of forms, the 
institutionalization of irony, the hypercommodification associated with the cultural logic of late 
capitalism—but evidence of an emergent twenty-first-century mode of textual production. I will 
call this metaproceduralism, a self-reflexive videogame technique that responds to and attempts 
to exploit (rather than resist or unveil) the informatic, algorithmic logic of cultural production in 
the digital age. In a time dominated by computational processes and procedures, by algorithmic 
objects that should be principally defined in terms of their actions, something different has 
                                               
3 For a recent discussion on postmodernism being more or less over, see Jason Gladstone and Daniel Worden, eds., 
“Postmodernism, Then,” special issue, Twentieth-Century Literature 57, nos. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 2011). The issue 
contains essays by a number of important scholars of the postmodern, including Hillary Chute, Ursula K. Heise, 
Andrew Hoberek, Adam Kelly, Mark McGurl, Brian McHale, Walter Benn Michaels, Rachel Greenwald Smith, and 
others. For a book-length development of some of the claims about irony, sincerity, and post-postmodernism, see 
Mary K. Holland, Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in Contemporary American Literature (New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). And for Fredric Jameson’s recent reflection on the period and the difference 
between postmodernism and postmodernity, see Nico Baumbach, Damon R. Young, and Genevieve Yue, “Revisiting 
Postmodernism: An Interview with Fredric Jameson,” Social Text 34, no. 2 (June 2016): 143–60. 
4 David Foster Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do 
Again (New York: Little, Brown, 1997), 63. 
5 Ibid., 81. For my further discussion of Wallace and irony, see Bradley J. Fest, “‘Then Out of the Rubble’: David 
Foster Wallace’s Early Fiction,” in David Foster Wallace and “The Long Thing”: New Essays on the Novels, ed. 
Marshall Boswell (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 85–105. 
6 See Adam Kelly, “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American Fiction,” in Consider David Foster 
Wallace: Critical Essays, ed. David Hering (Los Angeles: Sideshow Media Group, 2010), 131–46; and Adam Kelly, 
“Dialectic of Sincerity: Lionel Trilling and David Foster Wallace,” Post45, October 17, 2014, http://post45.research. 
yale.edu/2014/10/dialectic-of-sincerity-lionel-trilling-and-david-foster-wallace/. 
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happened in the development of videogames during the period after postmodernism than in 
literature. One of those differences is how we understand formal play in written as opposed to 
action-based forms. Another difference is how The Stanley Parable enacts how desperately we 
still need irony—and particularly what I will call procedural irony—in contemporaneity. 
 I should begin, however, by noting the obvious point that neither irony nor reflexive self-
awareness are unique to late-twentieth-century literary fiction, nor can such tropes easily disappear 
from the landscape of contemporary cultural production just because novelists may be turning 
away from irony. Rather, it might simply be the case that the metafictional experimentation of 
John Barth and Thomas Pynchon has shifted venues to media at different historical stages of 
development more conducive to the rewards of self-referentiality than the well-established and 
now receding novel. This is the case, I suggest, with videogames. At least since the fabulously 
self-aware Earthbound (1994) and Hideo Kojima’s fourth-wall-breaking Metal Gear Solid 
(1998)—when a boss battle with Psycho Mantis famously saw the game read the player’s memory 
card and incorporate this extra-diegetic information into the diegesis of the game—videogames 
have incorporated thoughtful self-reflexivity to a considerable degree. Though still a rather limited 
list, it is clear that in the twenty-first century, metafictional games are appearing with increasing 
frequency from both AAA and independent developers. Games such as Bioshock: Infinite (2013), 
Borderlands 2 (2012), Deadpool (2013), Eternal Darkness (2002), Far Cry 3: Blood Dragon 
(2013), Goat Simulator (2014), Jazzpunk (2014), Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons of Liberty (2001), No 
More Heroes (2010), Prince of Persia: Sands of Time (2003), Spec Ops: The Line (2012), Sunset 
(2015), and others, draw productive aesthetic and procedural attention to their status as videogames 
and as objects worthy of serious critical attention. These games are not embarrassed or apologetic 
about their diminished cache as “low” culture, but rather relish in the specific material processes 
of their medium, drawing metatextual attention to the uniqueness and formal possibility of 
videogames. 
 Further, I think it is important to note that self-reflexive videogames do not seem to be 
evidence of aesthetic exhaustion, but rather (if I may be so bold) of exuberance, novelty, and 
possibility. In a famous 1967 essay on the literary avant-garde of his time, Barth called the (as-
yet-named) postmodern metafiction of the postwar era a “literature of exhaustion”: “By 
‘exhaustion’ I don’t mean anything so tired as the subjects of physical, moral, or intellectual 
decadence, only the used-upness of certain forms or the felt exhaustion of certain possibilities—
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by no means necessarily a cause for despair.” 7  In contrast to a clear line of genealogical 
development from the fiction of Jorge Luis Borges to The Stanley Parable—a line that would place 
Pugh and Wreden’s game in a tradition of narrative fiction where it would come very late, an 
untimely moment where metafictional techniques themselves could be considered used-up, 
exhausted with exhaustion—I think we might more productively compare the emerging self-
reflexivity in videogames to early experiments with the novel. Books such as Miguel de 
Cervantes’s El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (1605, 1615) and Laurence Sterne’s 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759–67) seem like appropriate and 
productive historical touchstones for self-reflexive videogames. Like The Stanley Parable and 
other metagames, these novels explore the possibilities of a form still in its infancy (rather than its 
dotage). When Cervantes and Sterne were using the novel to interrogate its own conventions, it 
was an emergent rather than, as it is today, a residual form.8 The novel was also still trying to 
justify itself as serious literary art when Don Quijote and Tristram Shandy were initially 
circulating, defending itself from criticisms about its aesthetic value just as The Stanley Parable 
stages an encounter with contemporary critics who readily dismiss videogames on artistic grounds. 
Though many of the formal and generic conventions seem to have been established in videogames 
and may have, in some cases, ossified through overuse, there is still too little we know about their 
possibilities, partly due to the transforming technological and material means for making, 
distributing, and playing them. The host of interesting, ambitious, and surprising games released 
in the last few years demonstrate that videogames are a long way from formal exhaustion. If 
anything, the increasing presence of self-reflexivity in videogames should be read as a sign of their 
aesthetic maturation. Creators are asking important questions about what videogames can do and 
about what they can do with videogames, and this has resulted in a flourishing of compelling and 
successful experimentation. 
                                               
7 John Barth, “The Literature of Exhaustion,” in The Friday Book: Essays and Other Nonfiction (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1984), 64. On the history of the term “postmodernism,” see Perry Anderson, The Origins of 
Postmodernity (New York: Verso, 1998). 
8 For a discussion of the novel using Raymond Williams’s idea of emergent, dominant, and residual forms, see 
Jonathan Arac “What Kind of History Does a Theory of the Novel Require?” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 42, no. 2 
(Summer 2009): 190–95. For Williams’s original formulation in 1973 of emergent, dominant, and residual cultural 
forms, see Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” in Culture and Materialism: 
Selected Essays (1980; repr., New Yok: Verso, 2005), 31–49. 
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 That some of this experimentation shares certain obvious affinities with literary 
metafiction—even if coming from a place of possibility rather than exhaustion—should probably 
come as no surprise, particularly since videogames raise a number of issues vis-à-vis 
representation. Though there has been much significant writing about metafiction since William 
H. Gass coined the term in 1970, Patricia Waugh’s slim book, Metafiction (1984), remains one of 
the best overviews of self-reflexive postmodern literature, both in terms of the considerable 
international breadth of fiction she surveys and in terms of her book’s rich conceptual range. Like 
many other scholars, Waugh emphasizes metafiction’s relationship to representation: 
The metafictionist is highly conscious of a basic dilemma: if he or she sets out to “represent” the 
world, he or she realizes fairly soon that the world, as such, cannot be “represented.” In literary 
fiction it is, in fact, possible only to “represent” the discourses of that world. Yet, if one attempts to 
analyse a set of linguistic relationships using those same relationships as the instruments of analysis, 
language soon becomes a “prisonhouse” from which the possibility of escape is remote. Metafiction 
sets out to explore this dilemma.9 
 
Or consider Larry McCaffery’s discussion of mimesis with regard to the work of Robert Coover, 
Donald Barthelme, and Gass: 
 
Fiction cannot hope to mirror reality or tell the truth because “reality” and “truth” are themselves 
fictional abstractions whose validity has become increasingly suspect as this century has proceeded. 
Consequently we find that these works usually include a reflexive irony which mocks the realistic 
claims of artistic significance and truth; they also insist that the reader accept the work as an 
invented, purely made-up entity.10 
 
It is tempting to make similar points about self-referential videogames, perhaps even going so far 
as to harness Jean Baudrillard’s theories about simulation in order to emphasize that videogames 
emerge from a cultural moment in which “reality” is not accessible in any strict sense, and that 
videogames’ prodigious and unavoidable virtuality—the ways in which they simulate rather than 
                                               
9 Patricia Waugh, Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1984), 3–4, 
emphasis in original. For the first use of the term “metafiction,” see William H. Gass, “Philosophy and the Form of 
Fiction,” in Fiction and the Figures of Life (Boston: Nonpareil, 1971), 25. For other early discussions of metafiction, 
see Robert Scholes, “Metafiction,” Iowa Review 1, no. 4 (Fall 1970): 100–15; Raymond Federman, ed., Surfiction: 
Fiction Now . . . and Tomorrow (Chicago: Swallow, 1975); and Edward W. Said, “Contemporary Fiction and 
Criticism,” TriQuarterly 33 (Spring 1975): 231–56. Said’s essay is of especial note because of the relationship he 
suggests between French theory and US metafiction: “speculations on language and writing that begin with Mallarmé 
and continue in the French New Criticism have their American analogy in the formal speculation of certain writers of 
fiction. . . . For such novelists as Thomas Pynchon, John Barth (particularly in Chimera), Donald Barthelme, fiction 
is a language with its own field and play, its own internal system of reference, its own sense of the opportunities 
available for inventiveness. Fiction is viewed not as an intervention into reality, nor as addition to it—as was the case 
with classic realist fiction—but rather as an intervention in other fiction, or in other writing” (236–37). 
10 Larry McCaffery, The Metafictional Muse: The Works of Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, and William H. Gass 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982), 5. 
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merely represent worlds—always already frustrates any claim they might have to realism, making 
them ripe for the structural play and reflexive irony that were such markers of postmodern 
literature.11 But though mimetically realistic games have appeared with increasing frequency—to 
the point where a game such as Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare (2014) uncannily includes the 
voice and likeness of actor Kevin Spacey—it is difficult to look at E. T. the Extra-Terrestrial 
(1982), Super Mario Bros. (1985), World of Warcraft (2004–), Flow (2006), or Candy Crush Saga 
(2012), and suggest the medium traditionally has much at stake in accurately representing some 
stable referent outside of itself. Subject to technological and graphical limitations, the frequent 
subordination of narrative to play, and a need for coherent game mechanics, videogames frequently 
abjure accurate mimesis in favor of abstraction and ludic simulacra. If we are to locate how 
videogames adapt metafictional strategies, it might be productive to first look elsewhere than in 
graphical or linguistic mimesis.12 
 For critics such as Gass, McCaffery, Waugh, and others, one of the principal features of 
metafiction is how it draws attention to its own materiality, to the language and other materials 
(novels) out of which it is made, and principally to the fact that it is written. Gass writes: “The 
novelist now better understands his medium; he is ceasing to pretend that his business is to render 
a world; he knows, more often now, that his business is to make one, and to make one from the 
only medium of which he is master—language.”13 Or Edward W. Said: “an unavoidable primary 
fact about fiction is that it is written and that much of its play may occur precisely because it cannot 
be spoken.”14 Though videogames frequently incorporate written and recorded language, unlike 
the postmodern novel, the stuff out of which videogames are made is different. Rather than 
primarily a mimetic medium like film, photography, or writing, as Alexander R. Galloway argues, 
 
Video games are actions. Let this be word one for video game theory…. Consider the formal 
differences between video games and other media: indeed, one takes a photograph, one acts in a 
film. But these actions transpire before or during the fabrication of the work, a work that ultimately 
assumes the form of a physical object (the print). With video games, the work itself is material 
                                               
11 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994).   
12 For a broad discussion about further intersections between literature and games, see Astrid Ensslin, Literary Gaming 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014). For a reflection on The Stanley Parable, unnatural narratives, and the literariness 
of other contemporary videogames, see Astrid Ensslin, “Video Games as Unnatural Narratives,” in Diversity of Play, 
ed. Mathias Fuchs (Lüneburg, Germany: meson press, 2015), 41–70, http://meson.press/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ 
978-3-95796-076-4-Diversity-of-Play.pdf. 
13 Gass, 24. 
14 Said, 240.  
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action. One plays a game. And the software runs. The operator and the machine play the video game 
together, step by step, move by move…. The video game, like the computer, [is] an action-based 
medium.15 
 
Consequently, following the lead of how early critics of metafiction focused on written language, 
I am encouraged to start with the material specificity of videogames when seeking to understand 
what might be unique about their self-reflexivity. 
 In this, I think Ian Bogost’s work on procedural rhetoric is quite useful. Bogost locates the 
particular kind of mimesis unique to the action-based medium of the videogame in what he calls 
procedurality. He writes: “Procedural representation takes a different form than written or spoken 
representation. Procedural representation explains processes with other processes. . . . [It] is a form 
of symbolic expression that uses process rather than language.”16 For Bogost, though videogames 
can certainly build arguments and produce meaning through narrative, language, and images, their 
processes make them different from other forms. Consequently, when locating the particular kinds 
of meaning specific to the medium, videogames’ material processes should be privileged.17 As 
Galloway develops in his theory of gamic action, there are four domains where such processes 
take place: diegetic and nondiegetic operator acts, and diegetic and nondiegetic machine acts.18 
When a game runs, a variety of actions take place. The player or operator of the game acts in the 
diegetic space of the game; they manipulate nondiegetic menus and icons; machine actions occur 
in the diegetic world of the game; and the running processes of the machine affect gameplay 
nondiegetically. The intersection between operator and machine, between the gameworld’s 
diegesis and the nondiegetic acts of menus, pauses, and glitches, are where arguments are made 
and where meaning occurs in videogames. Thus it is at the intersection of machinic and player 
                                               
15 Alexander R. Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006), 2, 3, emphases in original. 
16 Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 9, 
second emphasis mine. 
17  For a further methodological formulation of proceduralism, see Michael Mateas and Noah Wardrip-Fruin, 
“Defining Operational Logics,” in DiGRA ‘09—Proceedings of the 2009 DiGRA International Conference: Breaking 
New Ground: Innovation in Games, Play, Practice, and Theory (2009), http://www.digra.org/digital-library/ 
publications/defining-operational-logics/. For a critique of proceduralism (that in some ways rehearses the old “non-
debate” between ludology and narratology in videogame studies), see Miguel Sicart, “Against Procedurality,” Game 
Studies 11, no. 3 (December 2011), http://gamestudies.org/1103/articles/sicart_ap. For a response to Sicart and a 
further refinement of Bogost’s ideas, see Mike Treanor and Michael Mateas, “An Account of Proceduralist Meaning,” 
in DiGRA ‘13—Proceedings of the 2013 DiGRA International Conference 2013: DeFragging Game Studies (2014), 
http://www.digra.org/digital-library/publications/an-account-of-proceduralist-meaning/; and Charles J. Pratt, “Players 
Not Included,” Game Design Advance (blog), January 11, 2012, http://gamedesignadvance.com/?p=2409. 
18 See Galloway, Gaming, esp. 1–38. 
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actions where the art unique to videogames happens. If videogames produce a self-reflexivity 
specific to their medium, a metatextuality distinct from the achievements of postmodern art, it 
follows that it will be found in the ways their machinic and operational procedures reflect upon 
themselves, in their metaproceduralism.  
The Stanley Parable is a clear example of a game that is about its own processes. It opens 
with a narrator telling the player that “this is the story of a man named Stanley. Stanley worked 
for a company in a big building where he was employee number 427. Employee number 427’s job 
was simple: he sat at his desk in room 427 and he pushed buttons on a keyboard.”19 Before the 
game even begins, the game’s dry, witty narrator informs the player that the protagonist’s job is 
procedural. Like the player herself, Stanley sits in front of a computer terminal pushing buttons 
when “orders came to him . . . telling him what buttons to push, how long to push them, and in 
what order.” By pushing certain buttons in certain ways based upon machinic input, Stanley’s job, 
like his operator, is to play a videogame (albeit a rather boring one).  
 
And then one day, something very peculiar happened, something that would forever change Stanley, 
something he would never quite forget. He had been at his desk for nearly an hour when he realized 
that not one, single order had arrived on the monitor for him to follow. No one had shown up to give 
him instructions, call a meeting, or even say hi. Never in all his years at the company had this 
happened, this complete isolation. Something was very clearly wrong. Shocked, frozen solid, 
Stanley found himself unable to move for the longest time, but as he came to his wits and regained 
his senses, he got up from his desk and stepped out of his office. 
 
 
The crisis underlying the narrative gambit of The Stanley Parable is a moment of systemic 
breakdown. The normal actions Stanley takes day in and day out cease, and the consequences of 
this, the narrator tells us, are not only existentially devastating to Stanley, threatening his very 
raison d’être, but they cause the entire community of workers around him to disappear. In moving 
between nondiegetic machine actions—the narrator’s opening monologue, the booting and loading 
screens, the camera movement into the first person point of view (POV)—and the possibility of 
diegetic player action, the game enacts a transition between labor and play, between one type of 
procedure and another. The failure of Stanley’s automated labor opens up the space for something 
else. As so many in the overdeveloped world use computers for more and more of life’s activities, 
from labor and communication to leisure and entertainment, the game encourages reflection on the 
                                               
19 The Stanley Parable (Galactic Café, 2013). Hereafter, when it is not obviously clear from the context of the 
quotation, this work will be cited parenthetically as TSP. 
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ubiquity of computational procedurality, the frequency with which people in the twenty-first 
century push buttons, and, ultimately, the possibility for other types of button pushing, for (critical) 
play. The Stanley Parable also acknowledges its own processes and machinic actions. As the 
operator is probably using their laptop—the same device with which they send emails, write essays 
using Microsoft Word, view portable document files in Adobe Acrobat, et cetera—the opening 
scene establishes a transition in the machine itself. The dull everydayness of using the computer 
as a tool dissolves, and its aesthetic and imaginative capacities assert themselves. 
 But the game does not allow us to linger for long in this space of utopian free play and 
imaginative possibility. Rather, as the player begins to wander through the empty office, the 
“immaculate, beautifully constructed” (TSP) employee lounge, and a meeting room cleverly 
satirizing office life, it becomes apparent that The Stanley Parable questions whether there is really 
any difference between digital labor and play, and if anything like a real “choice” can exist—and 
thus a real “action”—within the algorithmic confines of a videogame. Having navigated the first 
few rooms of the game, the narrator informs the player, “When Stanley came to a set of two open 
doors he entered the door on his left.” Here, it seems, is a moment of choice, a peripeteia where 
the actions of the player will be, in some way, meaningful. The player can choose to follow the 
narrator’s directive, obeying the call of the story and be its proper protagonist. Or the player can 
choose the door on the right, disobeying the past tense indicative of the narrator by following their 
own whims and desires, participating in that common rebellious urge to play videogames in ways 
other than they were intended, asserting their free will to explore the boundaries of the game’s 
architecture. The choice, of course, is a false one. The game’s mechanics allow Stanley to wander 
through the right door and to keep disobeying the narrator as Stanley’s operator sees fit, just as 
much as it allows for the “correct” choice (but not, say, jumping through the ceiling). As so often 
throughout The Stanley Parable, the game’s simple processes are presented as a choice between 
one action and another, which serves to put the game’s proceduralism front and center in all of the 
game’s scenarios.  
 Consequently, the game subtly emphasizes that choice is possible only because of the 
game’s narrative architecture. (The game has even anticipated the Bartlebian stance of choosing 
not to, of actively deciding not to play the game: if a player stops playing for five years and returns, 
they will earn the achievement, “Go Outside.”) The narrator could just as easily say, “Stanley 
chose fish,” in terms of the mechanics of choosing one door or another, but drawing the player’s  
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Figure 1. “When Stanley came to a set of two open doors he entered the door on his left” (The Stanley Parable, 
[Galactic Cafe, 2013]). Screen capture. 
 
attention to their control over Stanley’s actions makes it seem, at the level of narrative diegesis, 
that within the game’s code, free will, play, rebellion, and other unforeseen actions are possible. 
As the player begins to be shuttled from one set of choices to another, however—each branching 
decision tree following a narrative line to a different ending and then restarting to the beginning of 
the game—it quickly becomes apparent that the myth so many contemporary videogames sell 
themselves upon, the seeming ability to do anything (e.g., in Grand Theft Auto V [2013] or Fallout 
4 [2015]), is just that, a myth.20 The Stanley Parable, by paring down the possibility for action, 
draws procedural attention to the limits of its form. Just as metafiction plays with the limitations 
of language to represent or project a world, the game plays with the procedural limitations of 
videogames to enact a world. The game also makes clear that, for meaningful play to occur, there 
must be coherent boundaries within which action can take place. Just as a sonnet achieves its power 
through the limitations of lineation, meter, and rhyme, so too does a videogame achieve aesthetic 
                                               
20 For Pugh and Wreden’s response to the demand for total freedom to exist in videogames, see stanleyparable, “The 
Stanley Parable ‘Raphael Trailer,’” YouTube, July 29, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZ-IcS7mRSk. 
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complexity by the decisions it makes to draw boundaries within which play can occur.21 (To ask 
for an unbounded videogame, a game in which any and all actions are possible, is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the materiality of the medium, or indeed, of any medium.) 
 Perhaps the most procedurally complex moment in the game is also one of its most 
humorous and tedious. If the player chooses to continually ignore the narrator, jumping off an 
elevator onto a catwalk, departing from the obvious choices with increased abandon, the game will 
(unsurprisingly) begin to directly comment on its own status as a game, reflecting on Stanley’s 
seeming dissatisfaction with following the narrator’s scripted story. At one point, the narrator will 
try to construct a game Stanley might actually like, and then subjects him to perhaps one of the 
most obnoxious videogames ever created. The game is simple. To the right of the screen is a baby 
who is crawling toward flames on the left side of the screen. In the middle is a button that, if 
Stanley pushes it, will reset the baby to the right side of the screen. Most players, I imagine, spend 
a few moments pushing the button. Their affective heartstrings are briefly tugged by not wanting 
to let (an obvious cardboard cutout of) an infant painfully burn to death. Clearly, saving the baby 
is meant to draw upon the heroic pathos of one of the more common videogame scenarios: saving 
some innocent non-player character. But the baby is also loudly and annoyingly crying, and each 
push of the button is accompanied by its own grating sound, so after a few button pushes, rather 
than be subjected to a cacophonous racket, players probably happily (if grudgingly) sacrifice the 
child to the flames.  
Here one might comment upon how the game procedurally enacts the inevitability of death, 
the futility of trying to ultimately keep one’s child from harm, and the annoying reality of other 
people’s children crying in public spaces. As the narrator tells Stanley, “It’s a very meaningful 
game. All about the desperation and tedium of endlessly confronting the demands of family life. I 
think the art world will really take notice. But of course, the message of the game only becomes 
clear once you’ve been playing it for about four hours.” And this is indeed the case. If the player  
                                               
21 Indeed, for theorists of play, boundaries have long been important. For example, see Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: 
A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1950; Boston: Beacon, 1955), esp. 9–10. 
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Figure 2. The baby game in The Stanley Parable (Galactic Café, 2013). Screen capture. 
 
pushes the button for two hours, two tedious, embattled, wretched, ear-splitting hours, then another 
button appears that prevents a cardboard cutout of a puppy from dropping into a tank of piranhas. 
The player then has to move back and forth, pushing one button and then the other, heroically 
saving infant and canine, over and over and over again for two more hours.22  
During this entire process, the narrator eggs Stanley on. At first, he questions if the player 
is actually pushing the button: “I find it hard not to believe you’re simply running a program to 
click the button over and over automatically. Which kind of ruins the point of the game, don’t you 
think? Wouldn’t that take the art out of it?” The game acknowledges that its procedures are so 
mundane and repetitive that they probably can and should be automated. But this would defeat the 
entire purpose of the game, according to the narrator, as it is clearly the player’s action of pushing 
the buttons over and over—rather than any machinic actions that are taking place—which make 
this a meaningful task. At another moment, the narrator positively assesses the player’s 
commitment to pushing buttons, saying, “You’re here for the game! For the art! for the endlessly 
spiraling sense of pointlessness and despair! Yes, this is what drives your every action! Keep 
                                               
22 For a dramatically shortened version of the four hour baby game, see dustily, “The Stanley Parable: Baby Game 
Ending,” YouTube, October 19, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7GAtSIy4-w. 
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clicking that button! For hope! For freedom! For science! For love! Don’t ever, ever stop!” And 
finally, upon introducing the puppy, “This is it Stanley, art! I did it! Video games are art! Ah, but 
you have a good two hours or so to go, so I’ll just let you get to that.” 
 Obviously the game suggests that the narrator’s declaration about the player’s profound 
aesthetic button-pushing achievement—and the subsequent ending where the player will encounter 
a white screen and a black monolith, “the essence of divine art,” with whom they will “dance and 
eat and sin and . . . will do improv comedy based on suggestions from [it] for all eternity” (TSP)—
to be read as sarcastically as possible. At the end of the day, videogames, these fantasies of 
heroism, dominance, and violence, are really just repetitive, pointless button pushing; they provide 
false and empty goals of narrative completion, primarily played by the emotionally and 
intellectually stunted. No matter how shiny any particular title may be, or how thoughtfully 
constructed, a game’s operator is really doing nothing more than mindlessly pushing buttons 
within the confines of an arbitrarily constructed sense of an ending (when, I mean, let’s face it, 
they could be doing something else). How absurd would it be to call such an activity art? How 
absurd that people who play videogames pour in such repetitive hours of gameplay in order to 
reach some usually rather disappointing “end”? In other words, the sarcasm of the “Art Ending” 
signals a familiar culturally conservative response to videogames. As Roger Ebert and others used 
to think,  
I am prepared to believe that video games can be elegant, subtle, sophisticated, challenging and 
visually wonderful. But I believe the nature of the medium prevents it from moving beyond 
craftsmanship to the stature of art. To my knowledge, no one in or out of the field has ever been 
able to cite a game worthy of comparison with the great dramatists, poets, filmmakers, novelists and 
composers. That a game can aspire to artistic importance as a visual experience, I accept. But for 
most gamers, video games represent a loss of those precious hours we have available to make 
ourselves more cultured, civilized and empathetic.23 
 
Though he never comes out and explicitly says it, Ebert dismisses videogame creators from the 
pantheon of writers, directors, and musicians on procedural grounds. Because videogame creators 
make games, because they make something whose primary goal is to occupy and entertain through 
repetitive action, they do not fit within Ebert’s modernist aesthetics. Ebert values drama, fiction, 
television, film, and music, forms that require phenomenological attention, objects whose 
                                               
23 Roger Ebert, “Why Did the Chicken Cross Genders?” Movie Answer Man, November 27, 2005, http://www. 
rogerebert.com/answer-man/why-did-the-chicken-cross-the-genders. Ebert later revised his dismissal slightly, in 
“Video Games Can Never Be Art,” Roger Ebert’s Journal, April 16, 2010, http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-
journal/video-games-can-never-be-art, and “Okay, Kids, Play on My Lawn,” Robert Ebert’s Journal, July 1, 2010, 
http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-journal/okay-kids-play-on-my-lawn.  
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representations must be passively perceived over a period of time. Ebert fails to understand that 
games are not primarily visually or linguistically mimetic, and the most interesting questions about 
them may have little to do with traditional mimesis at all. The “Art Ending,” through proceduralism 
more than representation, achieves what Ebert demands of art. For instance, it allows players to 
think about the monotonously annoying banalities of adult life and parental responsibility. Further, 
I know The Stanley Parable, in whatever small degree, has increased my capacity for empathy: I 
will maybe give people a bit more slack the next time I hear a crying baby or a barking dog.24 I 
also perhaps feel a bit more cultured because I have had a chance to dwell upon what art is or 
might be and compare videogames to great novels (and how the baby game’s difficulty might also 
be making fun of the vaunted “difficulty” of modernism). 
 In many ways, then, The Stanley Parable allows its operator to aesthetically inhabit 
proceduralism, to metatextually get inside how meaning is made through even the most simple of 
gamic actions: pushing buttons. Discussing other art games such as Braid (2008), The Marriage 
(2006), and Passage (2007), Bogost argues that what he calls proceduralist games—as distinct 
from procedural rhetoric—do “not argue a position but rather characterize an idea. These games 
say something about how an experience of the world works, how it feels to experience or to be 
subjected to some sort of situation.”25 The Stanley Parable has something to say about how an 
experience of videogames feels, about how videogames work. For Ebert, of course games cannot 
be meaningful because pushing buttons cannot be meaningful. Perhaps for a conservative, 
modernist, pre-digital consciousness, games cannot help but seem mindless. The very thing that 
defines the material specificity of the medium—the fact that videogames depend on action—
formally negates any aspiration videogames would have toward art; in Ebert’s view, the best Super 
Mario Bros. can aspire to be is craft. (This is also the perspective that leads culturally conservative 
politicians to blame mass-shootings on violent videogames rather than easy access to guns.) But 
viewed metaprocedurally, and despite The Stanley Parable’s sarcastic, self-aware narrator, button 
pushing in the game is aesthetically meaningful. Four hours of obnoxious repetition, of screaming 
and barking and the constant threat of failure cannot help but evoke considerable affect from 
players, and can potentially inspire in them care, empathy, and intellectual contemplation (and 
                                               
24 In this, I think The Stanley Parable shares something with David Foster Wallace’s “Keynote Commencement 
Address,” Kenyon College, May 21, 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/20080213082423/http://www.marginalia.org/ 
dfw_kenyon_commencement.html. 
25 Ian Bogost, How to Do Things with Videogames (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 14. 
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perhaps even some powerfully negative feelings). Such an aesthetic perception, somewhat like 
meditation, can only be achieved in the player at a kinetic, bodily level, the level of thumbs pushing 
buttons over and over and over. Thus, even though the narrator drips sarcasm when he claims that 
videogames are art, we should also take him seriously: repetitive actions between the machine and 
player are where the art of videogames occurs. 
  But I should also be clear, even more than it creatively inhabits proceduralism, The Stanley 
Parable encourages players to critique and question it. Because of the recursive nature of 
metafictional irony, postmodern literature excelled at calling itself into question. Like books such 
as Kathy Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School (1984), Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse (1968), 
Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler (1979), Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves 
(2000), or Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962), The Stanley Parable questions its own forms in 
a variety of ways. It directly and cleverly references other experimental videogames such as 
Minecraft (2009) and Portal (2007). It also ironically addresses a number of videogame 
conventions: it exposes the overwhelmingly widespread banality of typical videogame narratives 
in the “Life Ending”; it makes fun of the contemporary obsession with leaderboards; it dispenses 
with the need for a coherent narrative storyline; it challenges the illusion of choice within 
proceduralism; it questions the link between the operator and Stanley until it dissolves; it parodies 
the silliness of endings where pushing a button will shut down a machine; it visualizes the panoptic 
surveillance of massively multiplayer games; it complexly explores the convention of the 
unreliable narrator; it lampoons entering secret codes; and it treats the notion of videogame 
“achievements” as absurd. The Stanley Parable is the contemporary independent videogame 
avant-garde’s most clear critical reflection on itself. Its autocritique lays bare the medium and its 
conventions in what can often be unflattering ways, treating videogames with a merciless yet 
playful irony. 
 This is most clear in how The Stanley Parable understands play, the activity where 
metaproceduralism most significantly departs from metafiction. Waugh says that for metafiction 
“play is a relatively autonomous activity but has a definite value in the real world. Play is facilitated 
by rules and roles, and metafiction operates by exploring fictional rules to discover the role of 
fictions in life. It aims to discover how we each ‘play’ our realities.”26 Metafiction reflects on 
                                               
26 Waugh, 35. 
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mimesis and how we go about representing our realities with language in different ways, which 
means that play, within its scope, is always already tied to language and particularly to writing. 
One of the clearest realities that much metafiction responds to, like The Stanley Parable, is “to the 
sense of oppression by the endless systems and structures of present-day society—with its 
technologies, bureaucracies, ideologies, institutions, and traditions,” and in the face of such 
postmodern systems, metafiction constructs grammatological systems, “a play world which 
consists of similar endless systems and structures.”27 What Tom LeClair calls the “systems novel” 
exceled not only at playing with and within linguistic signs, but at creating endless systems itself.28 
For much late-twentieth-century thinking, seen perhaps most clearly in Jacques Derrida’s famous 
discussion of the endless play of signs in “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences” (1967), play was something to celebrate, one of the few positive aspects of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism alike, with critical powers that include expanding 
consciousness, critiquing ideology, and rubbing history against the grain.29  As David Foster 
Wallace suggests, metafiction’s ironic free play (before it was institutionalized by television and 
the culture industry) was capable of “explod[ing] hypocrisy” in the postwar US.30 Sprawling 
systems novels such as William Gaddis’s J R (1975), Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), or 
Wallace’s own Infinite Jest (1996), all mobilize the technological sublime to critique the enframing 
of humans, American exceptionalism, and the brink of technological suicide the species teeters 
upon (among many other things). That this was done ironically through reproducing systemic, 
                                               
27 Ibid., 38. 
28 See Tom LeClair, In the Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988) and 
The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary American Fiction (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). Or 
consider McCaffery on Barthelme, Coover, and Gass: “We find that all develop basically the same pattern: a central 
character is presented who is lonely, alienated, disaffected, skeptical; these characters also feel themselves victimized 
by a repressive, cold social order to such an extent that their lives seem meaningless, drab, fragmented; in response to 
this powerful sense of personal isolation and violation, these characters decide to create or invent a system of meaning 
which will help to supply their lives with hope, order, possibly even some measure of beauty” (McCaffery, 4). This, 
to my mind, seems like it describes The Stanley Parable quite well. 
29 Recall Derrida’s discussion of play: “But nontotalization can also be determined in another way: no longer from 
the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of play. If 
totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance 
or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization. 
This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, 
because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is 
something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions” (Jacques Derrida, “Structure, 
Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978], 289). For a thorough discussion of the intellectual history of play and the 
intersection between games and literature, see Ensslin, Literary Gaming, esp. 19–36. 
30 Wallace, 66. 
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hyperarchival documentation and representation was the whole point of such encyclopedic 
tomes.31 Consequently, it is tempting to suggest that The Stanley Parable, in its systemic play, its 
critique of bureaucracy, and its exposure of the mechanical underbelly of semiotic systems, revives 
postmodernism’s utopian possibility of free play in videogames, as well as the possibility that they 
might be leveraged against, rather than continue being symptoms of, the informatics of life in the 
digital age. In other words, The Stanley Parable’s self-reflexivity relies upon the feeling that when 
a player boots it up, they have left the repetitive, reifying space of machinic labor and entered the 
anarchic space of play and utopian possibility. 
 But of course the “Art Ending” resembles labor far more than it does play, as does most of 
the game, truthfully. Whether we are talking about metafictional or about poststructural play, as 
Galloway points out, “although it is one of his most prized pieces of terminology, Derrida doesn’t 
as much say what play is as use the concept of play to explain the nature of something else, namely, 
the structure of language.”32 Consequently, when we talk about play in an action-based, procedural 
medium, it should not be surprising that play, and thus self-reference (and perhaps even irony), 
work differently than in written language. Play in videogames more fundamentally serves to shed 
light on other structures, namely a game’s processes. Furthermore, as “play” is the word most often 
used to describe the simple act of operating a videogame, play should not only be understood in 
terms of possibility, but in terms of control. Videogames, at their very heart, work differently than 
novels because code runs, it is actionable, which is materially different from written or spoken 
English.33 Though it is certainly celebrating play in a variety of ways, The Stanley Parable also 
notably succeeds in demonstrating and critiquing the relationship between labor and play in the 
overdeveloped world of the twenty-first century. To follow Waugh, of course the game “plays” 
with “reality” to make us think about the mimetic correspondence of the virtual game to the real 
world—i.e., games more and more resemble real life—but its metaprocedural play also makes 
                                               
31 On the encyclopedic novel, see Mark Greif, “‘The Death of the Novel’ and Its Afterlives: Toward a History of the 
‘Big, Ambitious Novel,’” boundary 2 36, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 11–30. For my discussion of the large postmodern 
novel, and particularly Infinite Jest, see Bradley J. Fest, “The Inverted Nuke in the Garden: Archival Emergence and 
Anti-Eschatology in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest,” boundary 2 39, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 125–49; for further 
discussion of massive textual objects, see Bradley J. Fest, “Toward a Theory of the Megatext: Speculative Criticism 
and Richard Grossman’s ‘Breeze Avenue Working Paper,’” in Size and Scale in Literature and Culture, ed. Michael 
Tavel Clarke and David Wittenberg (forthcoming). 
32 Galloway, Gaming, 27. 
33 For more on this issue, see David Golumbia, “Code Is Not Speech,” Uncomputing (blog), April 13, 2016, http:// 
www.uncomputing.org/?p=1716. 
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clear that the reverse is becoming increasingly true: in twenty-first-century control societies, the 
real has transformed into what McKenzie Wark calls gamespace. In the digital age, 
 
Play is no longer a counter to work. Play becomes work; work becomes play. Play outside of work 
found itself captured by the rise of the digital game, which responds to the boredom of the player 
with endless rounds of repetition, level after level of difference as more of the same. Play no longer 
functions as a foil for critical theory. The utopian dream of liberating play from the game, of a pure 
play beyond the game, merely opened the way for the extension of gamespace into every aspect of 
everyday life.34 
 
No matter how playful and ironic, irreverent and silly, The Stanley Parable never lets the player 
forget how play and labor have become blurred within the ubiquitous contemporary logic of 
computation and the spread of endless microlabor to every corner of their online existence. In so 
many ways, the game rigorously resists the ideological fantasy of perceiving videogames as 
limitless utopian sandboxes. It understands that to approach the form in such a way, unintentionally 
or not, endorses an exceptionalist view of the world that unproblematically values the new creative 
and “slash” economic realities of the twenty-first century and perpetuates a neoliberal fantasy of a 
world with infinite natural resources.35 And to its unending credit, The Stanley Parable emphasizes 
how the player herself is problematically complicit with the production and maintenance of the 
algorithmic logic of the present, what Gilles Deleuze famously calls the “control society.”36 
 For it is no accident that one of the “central” rooms of The Stanley Parable is a vast 
panopticon and that to “win” the game Stanley must turn off a Mind Control Facility.37 Stanley is 
a digital subject, an individual constructed by how he is plugged into the distributed networks of 
contemporaneity. He is algorithmically measured and controlled by the ubiquitous informatic 
surveillance systems surrounding him. Just as the big data projects of Apple, Amazon, Google, or 
                                               
34  McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), §16. For more on the 
gamification of twenty-first-century life, see Patrick Jagoda, “Gamification and Other Forms of Play,” boundary 2 40, 
no. 2 (Summer 2013): 113–44. And for a discussion about the divergence of labor and play in contemporary 
videogames, see David Golumbia, “Games without Play,” in “Play,” special issue, New Literary History 40, no. 1 
(Winter 2009): 179–204. 
35 For further commentary on videogames and neoliberalism, see Bradley J. Fest, “Mobile Games, SimCity BuildIt, 
and Neoliberalism,” First Person Scholar (forthcoming December 2016). 
36 See Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” in Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughlin (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 177–82. For one of the most fully developed analyses of the internet vis-à-
vis Deleuze and control, see Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). For my own reflections on control and the work of Galloway, see Bradley J. Fest, 
“Poetics of Control,” review of The Interface Effect, by Alexander R. Galloway, b2 Review, July 15, 2015, 
http://boundary2.org/2015/07/15/poetics-of-control/.  
37 For an interesting take on panopticism and videogames, see Tom van Neunen, “Playing the Panopticon: Procedural 
Surveillance in Dark Souls,” Games and Culture (February 2015): 1–18. 
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the National Security Administration attempt to track our every digital activity, such entities also 
want to be able to accurately predict how we will push buttons. The Stanley Parable begins in the 
dystopia so many games (and novels and films) have imagined: a world where humanity has 
become nothing more than reified automatons acting in the service of their nonhuman overlords, 
 
Figure 3. Panopticism in The Stanley Parable (Galactic Cafe, 2013). Screen capture. 
 
batteries in a digital matrix, a world where every day a corporation tells Stanley “what buttons to 
push, how long to push them, and in what order.”  But unlike most videogames, in The Stanley  
Parable there is no messianic figure who can unironically overturn this logic and heroically change 
the course of history. Nor does there seem to be much room for collective action in the game either. 
It dispenses with the hero with a thousand faces and gives us one without any face at all. This is a 
lonely hero, wandering the nightmarish, Kafkaesque halls of the world’s most existential office 
building, depopulated except for an unseen British man describing Stanley’s actions and berating 
him when he chooses incorrectly. In a world of ubiquitous, rhizomatic, and free floating power 
and control, of distributed networks tracking our every movement through the decision-space of 
the real, The Stanley Parable asks what happens when the informatic logic of contemporaneity 
breaks down, what happens when a possibility might open up, a place where the procedures of 
Fest   
Wide Screen Vol.6 No.1 ISSN: 1757-3920 Published by Subaltern Media, 2016 
21 
digital networks might be exploited, played with in a different way. Most importantly, the game 
asks how such things might occur. 
 Paul de Man once said, echoing Friedrich Schlegel, that 
The moment the innocence or authenticity of being in the world is put into question, a far from 
harmless process gets underway. It may start as a casual bit of play with a stray loose end of the 
fabric, but before long the entire texture of the self is unraveled and comes apart. The whole process 
happens at an unsettling speed. Irony possesses an inherent tendency to gain momentum and not to 
stop until it has run its full course; from the small and apparently innocuous exposure of a small 
self-deception it soon reaches the dimensions of the absolute.38 
 
I think this is how we are encouraged to read Stanley’s initial situation (and really, all the ways 
the game unravels tiny threads in absolute dimensions): the systems tying together the fabric of 
the meshwork of Stanley’s digital environment fail because of the introduction of postmodern 
irony and its historical transformation across different media. William Pugh and Davey Wreden 
have adapted modes from cold war metafiction for use in videogames, and something happens 
when those modes make the tropological leap to a different, procedural medium. Oversimply, 
when one starts The Stanley Parable, the game not only introduces irony into videogames, but 
enacts irony into the logic of the computer. The game attempts to get action to do something other 
than what it is doing, code to run other than it is supposed to run, systems logically responding to 
input in ways other than designed. Of course, these kinds of things are impossible, except 
metaphorically, except in the aesthetic space of videogame action. Considered as a medium of 
possibility, the computer ceases to be a mindless, laborious, button pushing machine when The 
Stanley Parable is executed, and becomes “art,” something else that, though it still involves 
endless button pushing, maybe will be not so mindless. In short, The Stanley Parable suggests that 
though the technological hyperspace of postmodernity may not be able to be represented without 
new modes of cognitive mapping, as Fredric Jameson once claimed, perhaps the gamespace of 
contemporaneity can be enacted differently because irony cannot be foreclosed in even the most 
algorithmic and process-based cultural artifacts.39  
The button pushing regime of Stanley’s that has been interrupted by the operator’s choice 
to start the game is the result of Pugh and Wreden turning their eyes on the materiality of the 
                                               
38 Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism, rev. 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 215. 
39 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism; or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1991), esp. 37–38 and 44–54. For more on the (un)representability of the postmodern sublime and contemporary 
networks, see Patrick Jagoda, Network Aesthetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), esp. 19–29. 
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medium itself (something Wreden also does in the differently metaprocedural Beginner’s Guide 
[2015]). And I think what has resulted is a notable achievement. The Stanley Parable aesthetically 
exploits the computational logic of contemporaneity; remarkably, it imagines other ways of being 
through using what, in another medium, seems a tired mode. We might say, then, that the 
adaptation of metafiction to techniques and processes unique to videogames results in procedural 
irony, allowing us to view videogames as not only symptoms of the US military-entertainment-
industrial-complex, which they certainly are, but as potentially powerful vehicles for ironic 
engagement with contemporaneity.40 I think The Stanley Parable also emergently signals that we 
need such artifacts, more objects capable of enacting what I have elsewhere called a “poetics of 
control.”41 The game’s use of procedural irony encourages us to exploit the protocological systems 
of the present, to imagine the tools around us being used in different ways. That such a commentary 
on procedurality is also found in a richly complex game—about which there is more to say, not 
only about issues of representation, choice, subjectivity, and aesthetics, but about gender, class, 
intertextuality, history, game culture, Deleuzian control, et cetera—is a significant formal 
achievement. As it turns out, videogames have a lot (more) to learn from postmodern metafiction. 
They have learned that irony is a powerful tool for fighting implacably massive systems, for 
exploiting the flaws in those systems against themselves in endless recursive narrative feedback 
loops (which, of course, postmodernists originally learned from computers). But they have also 
learned about fun, and a different kind of fun than videogames traditionally claim to participate in 
and perpetuate. This perhaps cannot be overstressed. In a world where gamespace has permeated 
everything, the emergence of the metaproceduralist game may not only allow us to imagine the 
world differently, but at last also to have some fun doing so, to play in a way that, perhaps for a 





                                               
40 I follow Terry Smith in his use of the term contemporaneity to describe the present moment after postmodernism. 
This is partly because I find it to be a nice “big tent” or “umbrella” term that is more elegant than “post-
postmodernism,” and partly for how it allows me to think about the impossibility of periodization in the “world as it 
is now. It is no longer ‘our time,’ because ‘our’ cannot stretch to encompass its contrariness. Nor is it a ‘time,’ because 
if the modern was inclined above all to define itself as a period, in contemporaneity periodization is impossible” (Terry 
Smith, The Architecture of Aftermath [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006], 9). 
41 See Fest, “Poetics of Control.” 
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